Zhe Wang's Home Page
Apr 12, 2023 · Google Scholar | GitHub. I am an associate professor at the Institute of Computing Technology (ICT), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). I obtained my Ph.D. in Computer Architecture from ICT in 2018, and my bachelor in Software Engineering from Beijing University of Technology (BJUT) in 2012.
Chenggang Wu, Mengyao Xie, Zhe Wang, Yinqian Zhang, Kangjie Lu, Xiaofeng Zhang, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Min Yang, and Tao Li Abstract —Intra-process memory isolation is a cornerstone technique of protecting the sensitive data in memory-corruption defenses,
The software-based randomization method has been proven to be vulnerable. The strict memory isolations for the metadata in defenses are needed. Memory corruption defenses need to keep their metadata safe. The safe region in CPI, the shadow stack in CFI, the randomization secrets in ...
In this paper, we propose a generic and eficient intra-process memory isolation technique named PANIC, by leveraging Privileged Access Never (PAN) and load/store unprivileged (LSU) instructions on AArch64. PANIC ex-ecutes process code in kernel mode and compartments code into trusted and untrusted components.
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Upon each re-randomization, RERANZ only needs to update the address translation table. To achieve efficient translation, RERANZ maintains a set of trampolines in the Code Cache. As shown in Fig. 3(b), each basic block has a corresponding trampoline located at.
RERANZ: A Light-Weight Virtual Machine to MitigateMemory Disclosure Attacks. ZheWang1,2, Chenggang Wu1 , Jianjun Li1, Yuanming Lai1, Xiangyu Zhang3,Wei-Chung Hsu4, Yueqiang Cheng5